ncinstaller

Project primer

ncinstaller — NinjaRemote Installer (review primer)

C++ installer/bootstrapper that deploys the NinjaRemote player onto end-user machines.
Windows-primary (macOS/Linux are config stubs); FLTK GUI + CLI/silent mode; CMake +
vcpkg (static linking), using Poco/libzip/libcurl. The player payload is typically
embedded in the EXE at build time (offline install), but a network/manifest-fetch path
also exists — treat either delivery route as in scope. Runs as the invoking user;
elevates for uninstall from Program Files by re-launching itself (UAC).

Architecture (durable map)

• Entry + CLI dispatch → FLTK wizard (EULA / language / progress) or silent / uninstall flow.
• Core setup: access check, legacy-directory cleanup, payload extraction (zip → install dir),

self-copy as the uninstall stub, URL-scheme + Add/Remove-Programs registration, player launch.

• Win32 filesystem/process/registry/locale helpers; localization from an embedded config;

compile-time constants (install paths, filenames, keys); an embed-resource build helper
that bakes the payload/configs into the EXE (one EXE per arch).

What matters most here (durable risk areas)

• Payload integrity. Whether embedded or downloaded, authenticity must be verifiable

(hash/signature) before decompress/exec — a real supply-chain surface. Downloaded payloads
must keep TLS/cert validation on.

• ZIP extraction safety. Decompression must enforce path-traversal and size limits — a

crafted archive must not write outside the install dir.

• Privilege / elevation. Uninstall re-launches elevated; watch TOCTOU on the copied stub,

temp-file handling, DLL/search-path hijack, and writable-directory races.

• Install atomicity. No rollback on partial install → a failure can leave a half-installed

machine; review cleanup on every failure branch.

• No auto-elevation for install (runs asInvoker); logic that assumes elevation is wrong.

Security-sensitive zones

Filesystem mutations + stub copy/execute; process launch (no signature check on the launched
binary); registry writes (URL scheme, Add/Remove-Programs) — HKCU vs HKLM scope depends on
elevation; the silent-accept-EULA path (consent bypass / compliance).

Compatibility surfaces (must not silently break)

• Install path (%ProgramFiles%\NinjaRemote) — uninstallers and player-locators depend on it.
• ninjarmm URL scheme — deep-link invocations from the web app / agent.
• Player exe / zip filenames — coordinated with the ncpeer build.
• CLI flags (silent-accept-EULA, uninstall, …) — used by RMM agent deployment scripts.
• Repository manifest JSON schema — contract with the update-delivery infrastructure.
• Add/Remove-Programs entry name — used by enterprise inventory tools.

Conventions & gotchas

• All Win32 path handling is UTF-16 wide-string; mixing narrow UTF-8 with wide APIs is a

recurring bug source — use the conversion helpers.

• Static linking throughout; one EXE per arch, each embedding only its own payload.
• "Program Files location" is detected by a locale-fragile string check — breaks on

non-English Windows.

• Install cleans up known legacy product directories — account for that when touching dir names.

_Orientation only — verify current specifics in the code; this describes durable architecture
and risk areas, not a snapshot._

Ecosystem map

NinjaRemote / NinjaOne project ecosystem (relationship map)

How the monitored repos relate — so a change in one repo is reviewed with its blast
radius in mind (a change upstream of ncpeer can break ncpeer even if it looks local).
Orientation only; verify specifics in code.

NinjaRemote product

• ncpeer — the remote-desktop client/agent (streamer host + player viewer). The hub.
• ncrp — the server/relay component NinjaRemote peers connect through; ncpeer ⇄ ncrp

speak the NCRP wire protocol (protocol/format changes must stay compatible across
client and server versions).

• ncinstaller — installs the ncpeer player onto end machines.
• qclauncher — bootstraps/launches an ncpeer quick-connect session.

Cloud-side relays of the ninja-remote system (AWS-hosted, Python/Go)

• websocket-switch — generic WebSocket pairing relay: two clients join with signed

URLs, it pairs them and forwards frames verbatim. Signed join URLs are minted by the
Ninja backend — the signature scheme is a backend⇄relay contract, and the frame
semantics are a peer⇄peer contract.

• file-transfer-service — the same pairing idea over plain HTTP for file transfer:

a signed upload leg streams to a signed download leg through memory (never stored).
Two parallel implementations (Python ftsv2/ + Go fts_go/) must stay behaviorally
identical; the URL/signature scheme is shared-family with websocket-switch.
NinjaRemote file-transfer features ride on these relays when peers can't go direct.

Pulled INTO ncpeer (and sometimes nmsnj) — upstream of the products

• nccommon — shared C++ library; a submodule of BOTH ncpeer and nmsnj. An API/ABI

or behaviour change here affects both consumers.

• nr-i18n — localization resources; a submodule of ncpeer.
• nrvirtdisplay — Windows virtual-display driver used by ncpeer.
• nrvusb — virtual-USB driver used by ncpeer.
• ncpeer_vcpkg — the pinned/patched dependency set (vcpkg fork) that **ncpeer and nmsnj

build against**. A dependency bump changes what those products link (security/ABI/build).

• ncpeer_qt6win7 — patched Qt6 (QtBase) for legacy-OS support, delivered to the clients

through the ncpeer_vcpkg overlay.

Largely independent

• nmsnj — network-management delegate (talks to the Ninja Backend over WAMP/RPC);

shares nccommon and ncpeer_vcpkg with ncpeer.

• ninjaflow — packet-capture library + agent (a distinct network-telemetry product, NOT

part of the remote-desktop family). Runs as a child process of the NinjaRMM agent (the
parent owns install/upgrade/policy/launch); NinjaFlow owns the CLI contract, config schema,
credential precedence, DB schema/migrations, and exit-code meanings the parent consumes —
those are cross-process contracts. Submits telemetry to the Ninja Backend. Shares no code with
ncpeer/nmsnj; adjacent to nmsnj only in domain (network), not in implementation.

• desktop-companion — internal companion app; mostly standalone.
• spaceship — AppSec SBOM-ingestion backend (Python/Flask). A distinct security product,

not part of any product's build. It consumes the SBOMs the other products' pipelines emit
(Ninja-Remote/ncpeer, NMS/nmsnj, NinjaFlow all appear in its scope maps), scans them for CVEs
and files Jira issues — a downstream *security-scanning* relationship, not a code dependency.
Shares no code with the others; has its own DB/schema and a toolbox submodule.

• ssh-pam-ninja — SSH one-time-password PAM gatekeeper (Linux C). A standalone

authentication component: its pam_ninja.so gates SSH reverse-tunnel access into
Ninja infrastructure with a time-based OTP. Shares no code with the other repos; its
blast radius is operational (who can SSH-tunnel into hosts), not code-level. The client OTP
generators and the module must agree on the OTP scheme + shared secret.

Review implications

• Reviewing nccommon / nr-i18n / nrvirtdisplay / nrvusb / ncpeer_vcpkg / ncpeer_qt6win7:

these are *upstream* of ncpeer (and nccommon/vcpkg also of nmsnj) — weigh the consumer
side: API/ABI compatibility, build impact, and cross-platform reach.

• Reviewing ncpeer or ncrp: the NCRP wire protocol between them is a cross-version

contract.